Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report PDF î

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report [Download] ➾ Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report By Columbia Accident Investigation Board – Volume 1 of a six volume set Investigates loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia STS 107 and its seven member crew on February 1 2003 Four parts entitled The Accident; Why the Accident Occurred; A Look Ah Volume of a Investigation Board Epub à six volume set Investigates loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia STS and its seven member crew on Columbia Accident MOBI :Ê February Four parts entitled The Accident; Why the Accident Occurred; A Look Ahead; and Appendices A B C Concludes with recommendations.

  • Unknown Binding
  • 248 pages
  • Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report
  • Columbia Accident Investigation Board
  • English
  • 12 October 2015
  • 9780160679049

10 thoughts on “Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report

  1. Manny Manny says:

    On the morning of Feb 1 2003 I was in Sunnyvale California staying with my friend and colleague Beth Ann The Shuttle was due to land that day and its approach path was going to take it right over us We set our alarms to get up early enough to see it But the sky was overcast and after hanging around for ten minutes we went back to bed We were woken up a couple of hours later by a phone call from Beth Ann's sister who had just heard the horrible news that the Columbia had broken up over Texas killing everyone on board Beth Ann is a real tough cookie but she started crying She had met Kalpana Chawla a couple of times and had really liked and admired her Later that day there was a big open air meeting at NASA Ames Research Center which a couple of thousand people must have attended It was like a funeral; I've never seen such a large crowd look so subdued The Center Director gave a speech and among other things he promised that there would be a full investigation It was vital to know exactly what had happened The investigation was indeed staggeringly thorough and efficient and in October they issued their report It's an absolute model for how to conduct an inuiry of this kind; even if you have no particular interest in space flight it's worth reading They examined the problem from every angle and I found the conclusions very interestingFirst there was a painstaking piece of scientific detective work which established beyond any reasonable doubt what the proximate cause of the accident had been As most people now know a piece of insulation foam had broken off the fuel tank during take off and had hit the wing breaking one of the Reinforced Carbon Carbon panels This created a hole which during re entry allowed superheated gases to get into the wing cavity melting everything inside it and destroying the Shuttle Next the investigation board wanted to determine why no one had realized that falling pieces of foam could have this disastrous effect They focused on the administrative procedures that had been used to sign off on safety and found some disturbing patterns Engineers would make recommendations about safety procedures based on their understanding of things that they thought could be potentially dangerous But if safety rules were broken and nothing bad actually happened there was a strong tendency to assume that the recommendations were not in fact important In this particular case people had been aware that falling pieces of foam might be dangerous during the take off seuence However since the phenomenon had been seen to occur several times and there had been no obvious conseuences it was in practice ignoredMoving back another step in the chain of cause and effect the investigators wanted to know why these unsatisfactory management procedures had been deemed acceptable They concluded that NASA was being put under great pressure to keep to schedules which were inherently unrealistic given available resources If they couldn't make Shuttle launches when they were supposed to construction of the International Space Station slowed down and milestones were missed This looked bad politically and there was a strong temptation to cut corners by relaxing safety reuirements In the end something was almost certain to go wrong If it hadn't been the foam it would have been something elseFinally the board asked the most basic uestion of all why did NASA allow this whole situation to develop Their ultimate conclusion was that the agency had lost its way at least as regarded manned space flight No one really knew any why they were doing it There was wide spread skepticism about the true value of building and running the International Space Station and no long term plan for space exploration that would build further on it Nearly all the people I talked to at NASA agreed with this It wasn't in the report but I also heard from several sources that NASA had never really wanted to build the Station in the first place; it had been a political move from then President Reagan and he had gone against the expert recommendationsI don't believe that the investigation board could have done a better job However they reported to George W Bush since NASA is under the Executive Branch of the US Government In January 2004 Bush announced the Moon Mars and Beyond initiative which as a first goal involves returning to the Moon by 2020 The budget assigned to cover this task is unfortunately at the bottom end of the feasible range The task will only be achievable if people creatively stretch resources to the limit with the known implications for safetyAs Hegel famously said the only thing we learn from history is that we don't

  2. Sean Sean says:

    A little dry but interesting just the same Motivated to read it by the videos at the MoF

  3. Katia M. Davis Katia M. Davis says:

    I read uite a few accident investigation reports usually by NTSB as they are available online for free I enjoy the forensic analysis of events that lead to a conclusion I don't usually add them to my Goodreads list I'm making an exception with this one though Why Because this report made me cry After reading the background information I'm surprised this kind of catastrophic incident took so long to occur The thing that struck me the most though was that they knew something terrible was liable to happen An email between NASA officials actually states Any activity today on the tile damage or are people just relegated to crossing their fingers and hoping for the best The I read of the report the I kept thinking Those poor people There were so many missed opportunities to identify and do something about the damage but all went unheeded or was dismissed Yes NASA was under budget constraints with reduced funding year after year Yes they were being asked to do with less Yes there was competition from other agencies Yes management was a pile of spaghetti Yes they knew that foam strikes occurred in 80% of missions that were able to be visually studied It was like the dirty little secret everyone knew about but hoped would never cause any real problem You can't be complacent with people's lives It's horrible to think about This report is a full in depth analysis of the history lead up occurrence and aftermath of the Columbia disaster I refuse to call it an accident because the cause was a known hazard People always say we should learn from incidents like this I suppose NASA eventually did by shutting down the shuttle programme and is now returning to manned vehicles atop rocket boosters with a crew recovery system The shuttle programme never reached its design potential anywayI would recommend this report if you are interested in getting your information from the source rather than relying on documentaries blogs or Youtube videos by conspiracy nuts that are subject to bias or do not tell the whole story This has everything from radio communication transcripts emails photo evidence calculations reconstructive analysis etc Very interesting very sad and it will uite possibly make you very angry

  4. Mathieu Mathieu says:

    Grim reading but valuable insight into how organizations can go wrong and how important it is for engineers to speak up when they are unhappy with a management decision

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